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With the conclusion of the 2019 California Legislative Session, there are 
several new avenues for employment lawsuits in this state. While the Legislature 
adjourned in the early morning hours of September 14, Governor Gavin Newsom 
did not finish reviewing the 1,042 bills sent to his desk until October 13. 
Thereafter, attorneys were able to evaluate several important labor and 
employment law changes that will result in employees filing many more lawsuits 
against California employers. This Article examines those measures. 
I. AB 9 – STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXTENDED FOR EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS 
The Legislature enacted AB 9 (Reyes) as Chapter 709 on October 10, 2019. 
This bill extends to three-year the statute of limitations for complaints alleging 
employment discrimination. It specifies the operative date of the verified 
complaint is the date that the intake form was filed with the Labor Commissioner.1 
The bill also makes conforming changes to current provisions for a person 
 
*  Chris Micheli is an attorney and legislative advocate for the Sacramento governmental relations firm of 
Aprea & Micheli, Inc. He received his B.A. in Political Science - Public Service (1989) from the University of 
California, Davis and his J.D. (1992) from the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. He is an 
Adjunct Professor at McGeorge School of Law. 
1.  See GOV. CODE § 12960(b), which provides: “For purposes of this section, filing a complaint means 
filing an intake form with the department and the operative date of the verified complaint relates back to the filing 
of the intake form.” 
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allegedly aggrieved by an unlawful practice when the person first obtains 
knowledge of the facts of the alleged unlawful practice after the limitations period 
expires 
AB 9 provides that complaints alleging a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act2 shall not be filed after the expiration of one year from the date upon which 
the alleged unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred.3 However, an 
employee shall not file a complaint alleging any other violation of Article 1 of 
Chapter 64 after the expiration of three years from the date upon which the unlawful 
practice or refusal to cooperate occurred.5 Finally, this bill prohibits its provisions 
from being interpreted to revive lapsed claims.6 
In support of the bill, the author argued: 
 
The #MeToo movement has brought attention to many of the dynamics related 
to sexual harassment. In particular, many victims have shared that they needed 
ample time to fully grasp what happened to them before they felt comfortable 
coming forward. In addition, the fear of retaliation often prevented victims from 
being able to report incidents of sexual harassment. These barriers are not limited 
to sexual harassment. Victims of all forms of discrimination and harassment may 
be initially unclear about what happened, unaware of their rights, or reluctant to 
report misconduct to their boss. This bill would address these barriers by extending 
the deadline to file a complaint involving a violation of the Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (FEHA) with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing 
(DFEH) from one year from the date of the violation to three years.7 
 
As sponsor of the bill, the California Employment Lawyers Association wrote: 
“One of the biggest barriers workers face when trying to seek justice and relief 
through our administrative or civil justice system, is the unreasonably short filing 
deadline for workers to submit their claims. . . . By the time they realize they have 
a legal claim, or feel emotionally and economically secure to file, they are often 
past the time to file or close to having their statute expire. . . .8 
In addition, in support, the Consumer Attorneys of California wrote: “Victims 
of harassment and discrimination should have time to file their claims with the 
Department commensurate with other types of civil actions, especially in light of 
the common barriers that exist, including trauma and a lack of awareness of their 
rights.”9 
In opposition to the bill, the California Chamber of Commerce and 49 co-
 
2.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 51, 51.5, 51.7, 54, 54.1, and 54.2. 
3.  GOV. CODE § 12960(e). 
4.  GOV. CODE § 12940. 
5.  GOV. CODE § 12960(e). 
6.  GOV. CODE § 12960 (3) provides: “This act shall not be interpreted to revive lapsed claims.” 
7.  ASSEMBLY FLOOR, CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS OF AB 9, at 1 (Sept. 5 2019). 
8.  SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS ON AB 9, at 6 (Jul. 9 2019). 
9.  SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS ON AB 9, at 6 (Jul. 9 2019). 




While AB 9 is being promoted as an anti-sexual harassment bill, it actually has 
a broad, sweeping effect on all employment harassment, discrimination and 
retaliation complaints. . . . AB 9 will impose a statute of limitations that is six-
times the length of the federal standard and three-times the length of the state 
standard. . . . If the statute of limitations is tripled for FEHA complaints, the 
employer will not have the ability to eradicate the inappropriate behavior in a 
timely and efficient manner. Extending the statute of limitations will reduce the 
motivation for the victims to quickly come forward. If the employer is not made 
aware of the harassing or discriminatory conduct, it cannot take the appropriate 
remedial measures necessary to properly deal with the offender. . . . For these 
reasons, we respectfully request that AB 9 be amended to only apply to sexual 
harassment claims because that is the impetus for the bill. Additionally, we request 
the bill be amended to clearly apply prospectively. . .10 
II. AB 51: EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS PROHIBITED 
The Legislature enacted AB 51 as Chapter 711 on October 10, 2019 The bill’s 
first section provides uncodified statements of legislative intent.11 
The bill’s second section adds a new provision to the law proclaiming that “[i]t 
is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to violate Section 432.6 of 
the Labor Code.”12 As such, the Legislature deems any violation of the prohibition 
regarding pre-dispute arbitration an unlawful employment practice under 
California Fair Employment and Housing Act  (“FEHA”)—which provides 
numerous remedies, including injunctive and declaratory relief, punitive damages, 
and attorney’s fees. 
The bill’s third section adds an entirely new section to the Labor Code.13 This 
new law prohibits a person from requiring any employment applicants or 
employees to waive any right, forum, or procedure for a FEHA violation or other 
specific statutes governing employment as a condition of employment, continued 
employment, or the receipt of any employment-related benefit.14 
This prohibition includes the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint 
 
10.  ASSEMBLY FLOOR, CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS OF AB 9, at 1 (Sept. 5 2019).” 
11.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.6 (enacted by Chapter 711) “(a) The Legislature finds and declares that it is 
the policy of this state to ensure that all persons have the full benefit of the rights, forums, and procedures 
established in the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Part 2.8 (commencing with Section 12900) of 
Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code) and the Labor Code. (b) It is the purpose of this act to ensure that 
individuals are not retaliated against for refusing to consent to the waiver of those rights and procedures and to 
ensure that any contract relating to those rights and procedures be entered into as a matter of voluntary consent, 
not coercion.” 
12.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.6 (enacted by Chapter 711). 
13.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.6 (enacted by Chapter 711). 
14.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.6 (a) (enacted by Chapter 711). 
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with or notify any state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, 
or any court or other governmental entity of any alleged violation.15 The law also 
prohibits an employer from threatening, retaliating or discriminating against, or 
terminating any applicant for employment or any employee because of the refusal 
to consent to the waiver of any right, forum, or procedure for a violation of specific 
statutes governing employment.16 
In addition, the law states an agreement that requires an employee to opt out 
of a waiver or take any affirmative action in order to preserve their rights is a 
condition of employment.17 In terms of enforcement, in addition to injunctive relief 
and any other remedies available, a court may award a prevailing plaintiff’s rights 
under this section as well as award attorney’s fees .18 
There is one exception to this prohibition. If a person is registered with a self-
regulatory organization that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines—or 
regulations adopted under that act pertaining to any requirement of a self-
regulatory organization—that person must arbitrate disputes that arise with their 
employer or any other person the self-regulatory organization’s rules specify.19 
The bill explains that “nothing in this section is intended to invalidate a written 
arbitration agreement that is otherwise enforceable under the Federal Arbitration 
Act (9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq.).”20 
The new law excludes post dispute settlement agreements and negotiated 
severance agreements.21 Its provisions are prospective in nature as it applies to 
contracts for employment entered into, modified, or extended on or after January 
1, 2020.22 
This bill also contains a severability clause. In other words, the provisions of 
this new section of law are severable. If any provision of this section or its 
application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or 
applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.23 
A. Statement of Legislative Intent 
Assemblywoman Gonzalez submitted a letter to the Assembly Daily Journal 
on September 14, 2019 which reads as follows: 
 
Dear Mr. Wilson 
The purpose of this letter is to express my intent in enacting Assembly Bill 51, 
 
15.  Id. 
16.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.6 (b) (enacted by Chapter 711). 
17.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.6 (c) (enacted by Chapter 711). 
18.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.6 (d) (enacted by Chapter 711). 
19.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.6 (e) (enacted by Chapter 711). 
20.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.6 (f) (enacted by Chapter 711). 
21.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.6 (g) (enacted by Chapter 711). 
22.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.6 (h) (enacted by Chapter 711). 
23.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.6 (i) (enacted by Chapter 711). 
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which prohibits California employers from forcing employees to waive their right 
to have certain potential legal disputes heard in the dispute resolution forum of 
their choice, as a condition of employment, continued employment, or the receipt 
of any employment-related benefit. The bill also protects California workers from 
retaliation if they refuse to agree to such a waiver. 
The bill states that it does not apply to postdispute settlement agreements or 
negotiated severance agreements. It is my intent that the term “postdispute” in this 
context means any time after both parties are aware that an actual point of legal 
controversy has arisen between them. It is my intent that the term “negotiated” in 
this context means that the agreement is voluntary, deliberate, and informed, 
provides consideration of value to the employee, and that the employee is given 
notice and an opportunity to retain an attorney or is represented by an attorney. 
Sincerely, 
Lorena Gonzalez, Assemblymember, 80th District 
 
In support of the bill, the author wrote: 
 
Forced arbitration agreements have become a common tool of employers who 
seek to prevent employees from filing a lawsuit or, in instances of discrimination 
or harassment, filing a complaint with the state’s Labor Commissioner or 
Department of Fair Employment and Housing. Instead, employees who sign these 
agreements are forced to go through the arbitration process with any workplace 
violation complaint. A 2015 report by the California Labor Federation described 
this process as “a rigged system. . .in which an employer pays for its own 
arbitrators who then hear disputes in private. . .this process rarely results in justice 
for an exploited worker.” Workers often do not even realize what they are signing 
when they enter into these contracts as a condition of employment. In forced 
arbitration, any settlements often require the victim to refrain from discussing the 
case publicly. In a workplace with a culture of discrimination and harassment, 
these arbitration agreements are p majority of employment disputes subject to 
mandatory arbitration agreements “simply evaporate before they are ever filed.”24 
The Consumer Attorneys of California wrote,  “The real impact of forced 
arbitration is not dispute resolution, but claim suppression. The disappearance of 
workplace claims cannot be an acceptable outcome.” A February 2018 article 
concluded that the vast majority of employment disputes subject to mandatory 
arbitration agreements “simply evaporate before they are ever filed.”25 
As a sponsor of the bill, the California Labor Federation wrote “Forced 
arbitration of sexual harassment claims epitomizes all of the most harmful 
practices that have enabled widespread abuse to go undetected for decades. 
Workers are forced to sign away their rights in order to get hired. When they seek 
 
24.  SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 51, at 10 (Jul. 9, 2019); SENATE 
FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 51, at 4 (May 5, 2019). 
25.  SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 51, at 10-11 (Jul. 9, 2019).  
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to report violations, they are denied the ability to go to court or file a claim with 
the Labor Commissioner. Instead they are trapped in the employer’s handpicked 
arbitration system. The system is secret and confidential, protecting abusers from 
any public scrutiny. State agencies have no knowledge of repeat violations or 
arbitration decisions and there is no public record.”26 
In opposition to the bill, the California Chamber of Commerce and 55 co-
signatories wrote: 
[AB 51]: (1) essentially prohibits arbitration of labor and employment claims 
as a condition of employment and is likely preempted by federal law; (2) exposes 
employers to criminal liability regarding arbitration agreements; and, (3) adds 
another private right of action onto employers under the Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (FEHA). AB 51 will create more litigation, significant delays in the 
resolution of disputes, and higher costs for employers and employees. . . . 
[T]he United States Supreme Court and California Supreme Court have issued 
numerous opinions over the past decade that have consistently held any state 
statute that interferes with, discriminates against, or limits the use of arbitration is 
preempted. . . .Accordingly, AB 51 will undoubtedly be challenged as preempted 
under the FAA, creating more litigation, but not actually providing any benefit to 
employees as intended. . . . 
Given the placement of the provisions of AB 51 in Chapter 2, Article 3 of the 
Labor Code, it is subject to Labor Code Section 433, particularly toxic. 
Given the placement of the provisions of AB 51 in Chapter 2, Article 3 of the 
Labor Code, it is subject to Labor Code Section 433, which states that any violation 
of Article 3 is a misdemeanor. Accordingly, not only will an employer face civil 
liability for any violation of the various provisions of AB 51 . . . but also an 
employer can face criminal charges. . . . 
By banning arbitration, the only option left for employees to resolve many 
labor and employment claims is litigation. . . . Accordingly, eliminating arbitration 
as proposed by AB 51 will flood the already crowded dockets of the civil courts 
with new lawsuits that will significantly delay effective resolution of all civil 
claims.27 
In further opposition to the bill, the California State Council of the Society for 
Human Resources Management wrote: 
 
[A]lthough AB 51 states it is intended to combat “sexual harassment,” as 
drafted it actually applies to ALL violations of the California Fair Employment 
and Housing Act (FEHA), as well as the Labor Code. While much the of the 
testimony on the bill during the legislative process was focused on high profile 
sexual harassment incidents, it is important to note that the bill would significantly 
affect the entire body of workplace disputes, including wage and hour claims, 
 
26.  ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE HEARING ON AB 51, at 3 (Mar. 5, 
2019). 
27.  SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 51, at 11-12 (Jul. 9, 2019).  
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discrimination, etc. In this regard, this bill goes way beyond its stated purpose, and 
would unnecessarily preclude the more efficient arbitration resolution mechanism 
even where the bill’s author has not identified any public policy reason to do so. 
[Emphasis in the original.]28 
III. AB 673: FAILURE TO PAY WAGES PENALTIES 
The Legislature enacted AB 673 (Carrillo) as Chapter 716 on October 10, 
2019. The bill contains one section which provides several amendments to Section 
210 of the Labor Code. This provision’s purpose is to provide penalties for failure 
to pay wages to workers in this state. First, the bill adds a new category of failure 
to pay wages to being subject to a penalty.29 Second, it removes the description of 
a “civil” penalty.30 
Third, it provides the penalties under Labor Code Section 210: statutory 
penalties for employees,  or the Labor Commissioner may recover a civil penalty 
through a citation.31 The procedures for issuing, contesting, and enforcing 
judgments for these citations issued by the Labor Commissioner are the same as 
existing law.32 
Finally, the new law specifies that an employee can only recover the statutory 
penalty provided in Section 210 or to enforce a civil penalty under the Private 
Attorneys General Act,33 but not both, for the same violation of the Labor Code.34 
In support of the bill, the author wrote: 
 
This February, the Labor Commissioner issued the largest citation in state 
history, fining a Los Angeles construction company nearly $12 million for 
repeated wage theft violations that left more than a thousand workers waiting 
weeks or months for their pay. . . . In San Francisco, a worker was evicted from 
his apartment because he was not able to pay his rent on time due to his employer 
being weeks late in paying him his wages. 
Employees who are not paid on time have no clear or effective recourse. At 
present, an employee could file a lawsuit under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) to recover the unpaid wages plus damages. (Biggs v. Wilson, 1 F.3d 1537 
(9th Cir. 1993)). However, it is unsettled whether an employee can file such a claim 
for late payments under the equivalent state law provisions.35 
As sponsors of the bill, the California Employment Lawyers Association, 
 
28.  SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 51, at 11-12 (Jul. 9, 2019). 
29.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 210 (a) (enacted by Chapter 716). 
30.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 210 (a) (enacted by Chapter 716). 
31.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 210(b). 
32.  Compare CAL. LABOR CODE § 1197.1(b) – (k), with CAL. LABOR CODE § 210 (enacted by Chapter 
716). 
33.  See CAL. LABOR CODE § 2699 (a). 
34.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 210 (enacted by Chapter 716). 
35.  ASSEMBLY FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 673, at 1 (May 24 2019). 
2020 / Will California Open the Floodgates to Employment Litigation 
292 
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, the Center for Workers’ Rights, and 
Legal Aid at Work wrote: 
 
[C]urrent law does not explicitly provide a remedy for employees who are not 
paid on their designated payday. This can cause extreme financial hardship for the 
many employees living paycheck to paycheck, who need their wages paid on time 
so that they can pay for food, rent, and other daily necessities. Moreover, this delay 
in payment essentially amounts to an interest-free loan from the employee to the 
employer. . . . 
The problem is that employees who are not paid on time have no clear or 
effective recourse. . . . Other Labor Code penalties for late payments may be 
available, but only in limited circumstances or are otherwise impractical to 
pursue. . . . AB 673 will amend section 210 to provide a clear remedy for 
employees who are not paid on time.36 
Additionally, California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, wrote: 
In our 35 plus year history of representing farm workers, we have seen many 
instances when an unscrupulous farm labor contractor has failed to issue farm 
workers a pay check when it is due. In our experience, this is a tactic of control 
and oppression utilized almost exclusively in the underground economy. . . . 
Farm worker clients of rural legal services offices are often told by such 
employers: “I owe you the money but I can only pay half today. Work next week 
and I’ll pay you everything I owe at the end of the week.” What happens the next 
week varies—sometimes they pay, sometimes not—but often the workers get 
strung along until the end of the job (when they still may not get paid all they’re 
owed). 
Although there are adequate and effective legal remedies when an employer 
cuts workers a bad check, or stiffs them after they’ve quit or been discharged, 
failure to issue a paycheck to a current employee when it is due has weak remedies. 
For example, under California law, only the Labor Commissioner can issue a civil 
penalty against a violating employer, and she has rarely used that authority. 
Workers cannot even bring a claim before the Labor Commissioner to recover a 
penalty for this behavior, which perversely incentivizes some employers to 
continue to engage in these practices.37 
Opposing to the bill, a coalition of five local chambers of commerce wrote: 
 
“California already has some of the most onerous and complex labor laws in 
the country. This complexity is exemplified by the duplicative penalty provisions 
contained in the Labor Code. With this statutory scheme, one, unintentional and 
minor violation of the Labor Code can result in the threat of financially devastating 
civil litigation against an employer. One prime example is found in Labor Code 
Section 210. Labor Code Section 210 is the penalty provision imposed for late 
 
36.  SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 673, at 5-6 (Jul. 9 2019). 
37.  SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 673, at 6 (Jul. 9 2019). 
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payment of wages. . . . Paying an employee ‘on time’ might seem like a simple 
requirement; however, it is increasingly difficult to do so in California. . . . 
[R]ecent cases demonstrate the challenge employers face in determining the 
appropriate calculation and payment of wages, such as overtime.”38 
IV. AB 749: “NO-HIRE” CLAUSES PROHIBITED 
The Legislature enacted AB 749 (Stone) as Chapter 808 on October 12, 2019. 
The bill adds Chapter 3.6 (commencing with Section 1002.5) to Title 14 of Part 2 
of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), and names it “Agreements Settling 
Employment Disputes.” It only adds one section to the CCP. 
This bill prohibits an agreement to settle an employment dispute from 
containing a provision that prohibits, prevents, or otherwise restricts a settling 
party that is an aggrieved person from working for the employer against which the 
aggrieved person has filed a claim or any parent company, subsidiary, division, 
affiliate, or contractor of the employer.39 
If the employer has made a good faith determination that the person engaged 
in sexual harassment or sexual assault, Chapter 808 clarifies that an employer and 
an aggrieved person are free to agree to end a current employment relationship40, 
or to prohibit or otherwise restrict the settling aggrieved person from obtaining 
future employment with the settling employer, if the employer has made a good 
faith determination that the person engaged in sexual harassment or sexual 
assault.41 
Chapter 808 further clarifies that an employer is not required to continue to 
employ or rehire a person if there is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or 
nonretaliatory reason for terminating the employment relationship or refusing to 
rehire the person.42 
The bill provides that a provision in an agreement entered into on or after 
January 1, 2020, that violates this no-rehire clause prohibition is void as a matter 
of law and against public policy.43 Finally, the bill defines three terms44 that are 
used in the new statute: 
 
“Aggrieved person” means a person who has filed a claim against the person’s 
employer in court, before an administrative agency, in an alternative dispute 
resolution forum, or through the employer’s internal complaint process.45 
“Sexual assault” means conduct that would constitute a crime under Section 
 
38.  SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 673, at 6-7 (Jul. 9 2019). 
39.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §.5(a). 
40.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1002.5(b)(1)(A). 
41.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1002.5(b)(1)(B). 
42.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1002.5(b)(2). 
43.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1002.5(a). 
44.  See CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1002.5(c). 
45.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1002.5(c)(1). 
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243.3, 261, 262, 264.1, 286, 287, or 289 of the Penal Code, assault with the intent 
to commit any of those crimes, or an attempt to commit any of those crimes.46 
“Sexual harassment” has the same meaning as in subdivision (j) of Section 
12940 of the Government Code.47 
 
In support of the bill, the author stated: 
 
AB 749 will bring greater fairness and clarity to existing law by voiding any 
settlement provision arising from an employment dispute if the provision restricts 
the ability of an “aggrieved” employee to work for the employer. The bill defines 
an “aggrieved” employee as one who has filed a claim against the employer, 
whether the employee filed the claim in court, with an administrative agency, in 
an alternative dispute resolution forum, or through an internal grievance procedure. 
In short, it will only protect employees who are victims of alleged discrimination, 
harassment, or other labor law violations. It will not protect the perpetrators of 
wrongful acts that give rise to an employment dispute. An employer always retains 
the right to discharge an employee or refuse to re-hire an employee if there are 
valid grounds for doing so.48 
 
In addition, as sponsors of the bill, the California Employment Lawyers 
Association and Equal Rights Advocates wrote: 
 
Our attorneys often represent victims of sexual harassment and other forms of 
discrimination and workplace abuse in settlement negotiations. A troubling trend 
that our attorneys have witnessed in these negotiations, particularly in the wake of 
the #MeToo movement, is the increasingly common use of “no-rehire” provisions 
that employers impose as a condition of settling a dispute. Often, this bars workers 
from not only returning to their same employer, but from working at any workplace 
that is owned, operated, affiliated, or that contracts with the employer. . . . 
 
Such provisions are especially egregious when they require the victim of 
discrimination or sexual harassment to forgo continuing employment, while the 
offender remains in the job. Such clauses can therefore also dissuade employees 
from reporting workplace misconduct in the first place for fear of lasting 
repercussions on their careers.49 
Also, in support, the California Women’s Law Center wrote: 
 
“No-rehire” clauses punish victims by barring them from returning to their 
employer as well as from working anywhere owned, operated or affiliated with 
 
46.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1002.5(c)(2). 
47.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1002.5(c)(3). 
48.  SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 749, at 8 (Jul. 9 2019). 
49.  SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 749, at 8-9 (Jul. 9 2019). 
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that employer. In many cases, such provisions impose a substantial burden on an 
employee’s ability to practice a chosen occupation or career. These retaliatory 
provisions dissuade employees from reporting workplace misconduct out of fear 
of being penalized for doing so. AB 749 would bring greater fairness to the 
settlement process by prohibiting any provision that restricts the ability of an 
employee who is a victim of alleged discrimination, harassment or other labor 
employment law violation, to continue to work for that employer.50 
 
On the other hand, in opposition to the bill, the California Chamber of 
Commerce and 21 co-signatory business and trade associations wrote: 
[AB 749’s] language fails to consider . . . that many employees who have 
engaged in unlawful or egregious behavior often file complaints against their 
employers. 
For example, in sexual harassment cases, it is not uncommon for the alleged 
harasser to file a complaint against an employer for defamation. . . . [B]y simply 
filing a complaint of defamation through the employer’s internal complaint 
process, the alleged harasser would be protected under AB 749 and have the right 
to seek re-employment at the same workplace, with the same employee whom the 
individual harassed. . . . 
[E]xisting law already provides a limitation on the use of no re-hire provisions 
in settlement agreements to the extent they impose a “restraint of a substantial 
character.” Completely banning the use of no re-hire provisions in settlement 
agreements for any “aggrieved employee,” no matter how narrowly tailored, as 
proposed by AB 749, imposes unnecessary administrative burdens on an employer 
as well as potential litigation.51 
V. SB 707: ARBITRATION DISCRETIONARY IF FEES ARE NOT PAID 
The Legislature enacted SB 707 (Wieckowski) as Chapter 870 on October 13, 
2019. In the bill’s first section, there are six legislative findings and declarations, 
including statements that private contracts that violate public policy are 
unenforceable.52 Also, the California Supreme Court has concluded that an 
employee arbitration agreement cannot require the employee to bear additional 
expenses that would not otherwise be required in a court action.53 
In addition, a company’s failure to pay arbitration service provider fees hinders 
the efficient resolution of disputes.54 Additionally, a company’s strategic non-
payment of fees severely prejudices the ability of employees and consumers to 
 
50.  SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 749, at 9 (Jul. 9 2019). 
51.  SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 749, at 9 (Jul. 9 2019). 
52.  Section 1, subdivision (a). 
53.  Section 1, subdivision (b). 
54.  Section 1, subdivision (c). 
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vindicate their rights.55 
The Legislature cited two cases from the Ninth Circuit regarding an 
employer’s refusal to pay fees or participate in arbitration constitutes a material 
breach.56 Finally, it is the Legislature’s intent to affirm three state court decisions 
regarding a company’s failure to pay arbitration fees that constitute a breach of the 
arbitration agreement.57 
Section two of the bill amends Section 1280 of the Code of Civil Procedure by 
adding three definitions: “consumer”; “drafting party”; and “employee.” 
Consumer means an individual who uses or purchases any goods or services 
for personal or household purposes.58 Drafting party means the company or 
business that includes in a consumer or employment agreement any arbitration 
provision.59 Employee means an applicant for employment, as well as a current or 
former employee, and those who have been misclassified as an independent 
contractor.60 
Section Three of the bill amends Section 1281.96 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure to add specified information to be collected. Under existing law, a 
private arbitration company that administers or is otherwise involved in a 
consumer arbitration shall collect, publish at least quarterly, and make available to 
the public on its website a single cumulative report that contains specified 
information regarding each consumer arbitration within the preceding five years.61 
This bill adds a twelfth category of specified information.62 As a result, the 
private arbitration company must collect the following information: Demographic 
data—reported in the aggregate—relative to ethnicity, race, disability, veteran 
status, gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation of all arbitrators as self-
reported by the arbitrators.63 Demographic data, disclosed or released pursuant to 
this paragraph, shall also indicate the percentage of respondents who declined to 
respond.64 
Section four of the bill adds Section 1281.97 to the Code of Civil Procedure. 
In either employment or consumer arbitrations that require the drafting party to 
 
55.  Section 1, subdivision (d). 
56.  Section 1, subdivision (e). 
57.  Section 1, subdivision (f). 
58.  New subdivision (c) reads as follows: “Consumer” means an individual who seeks, uses, or acquires, 
by purchase or lease, any goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes. 
59.  New subdivision (e) reads as follows: “Drafting party” means the company or business that included a 
predispute arbitration provision in a contract with a consumer or employee. The term includes any third party 
relying upon, or otherwise subject to the arbitration provision, other than the employee or consumer. 
60.  New subdivision (f) reads as follows: “Employee” means any current employee, former employee, or 
applicant for employment. The term includes any person who is, was, or who claims to have been misclassified 
as an independent contractor or otherwise improperly placed into a category other than employee or applicant for 
employment. 
61.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.96(a)(12) (enacted by Chapter 870). 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. 
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pay certain fees and costs before the arbitration can proceed, the drafting party is 
in material breach of the agreement, is in default, and thereby waives its right to 
compel arbitration if the fees or costs to initiate an arbitration are not paid within 
30 days after their due date.65 
If the drafting party materially breaches the agreement and is in default, the 
consumer or employee can either withdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed 
to civil court or compel arbitration in which the drafting party must pay all fees and 
costs.66 If the consumer or employee proceeds with a court action, the statute of 
limitations is tolled as of the first filing of a claim.67 If such a civil action proceeds, 
then the court must impose sanctions on the drafting party.68 
Section five of the bill adds Section 1281.98 to the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Similar to the prior section of law, in either employment or consumer arbitrations 
that require the drafting party to pay certain fees and costs during the pendency of 
an arbitration proceeding, the drafting party is deemed to be in material breach of 
the agreement, is in default and thereby waives its right to compel arbitration if the 
fees or costs to continue an arbitration are not paid within 30 days after their due 
date.69 
If the drafting party materially breaches the agreement and is in default, the 
consumer or employee “may unilaterally elect” to either withdraw the claim from 
arbitration and proceed to civil court,70 or continue the arbitration if the arbitration 
company agrees to continue the procedure.71 The arbitration company may 
institute a collection action at the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding against 
the drafting party.72 
The employee or consumer may petition the court for an order compelling the 
drafting party to pay all arbitration fees it is obligated to pay.73 Or the consumer or 
employee can pay the drafting party’s fees and be awarded in recovery the fees 
that were paid on the drafting party’s behalf.74 
If the consumer or employee proceeds with a court action, the statute of 
limitations is tolled as of the first filing of a claim.75 And, if such a civil action 
proceeds, the employee or consumer may bring a motion or action to recover all 
attorney’s fees and costs for the abandoned arbitration proceeding.76 Thereafter, 
 
65.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.96(a)  
66.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.97(b)(1); CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.97(b)(2). 
67.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.97(c). 
68.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.97(d). 
69.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.98(a). 
70.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.98(b)(1). 
71.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.98(b)(2). 
72.  Id. 
73.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.98(b)(3). 
74.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.98(b)(4). 
75.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.98(b)(1). 
76.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.98(c)(1). 
2020 / Will California Open the Floodgates to Employment Litigation 
298 
the court must impose sanctions on the drafting party.77 In addition, if the employee 
or consumer continues the arbitration, the arbitrator must impose monetary, issue, 
evidence, or terminating sanctions against the drafting party.78 
Section six of the bill adds Section 1281.99 to the Code of Civil Procedure. 
This section requires a court to impose a monetary sanction against a drafting party 
that materially breaches an arbitration agreement.79 If the court imposes such a 
sanction, the drafting party must pay the reasonable expenses—including 
attorneys’ fees and costs—incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of the 
material breach.80 
In addition to a monetary sanction, a court may order additional sanctions 
against a drafting party unless the court finds that the party acted with substantial 
justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction 
“unjust.”81 The additional sanction can include an evidence sanction82 or a 
terminating sanction.83 
In support of the bill, the California Employment Lawyers Association states: 
“SB 707 bill addresses two distinct problems in arbitration. First, workers and 
consumers face the procedural limbo and delay when they submit to arbitration, 
pursuant to a mandatory arbitration agreement, but the employer fails or refuses to 
pay their share of the arbitration fees. Second, the alarming lack of diversity in the 
arbitration industry, which calls into question the ability of the industry to fairly 
adjudicate claims brought by an increasingly diverse workforce in California.”84 
The California Chamber of Commerce and a coalition of affiliated business 
organizations, opposed the bill, writing “The main remaining concern is the actions 
or omissions that qualify as a ‘material breach’ and trigger loss of opportunity to 
arbitrate, monetary damages/sanctions, and possibly more severe sanctions such 
as evidentiary or terminating sanctions. For example, we are concerned that, even 
if the drafting party paid a majority of the fees and costs, but yet a small, minor 
portion was not paid, SB 707 would deem that nominal amount a ‘material breach’, 
thereby subjecting the employer or company to the same list of punishments as an 
employer or company who intentionally withheld the entire payment in an effort 
to delay the arbitration.”85 
 
 
77.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.98(c)(2). 
78.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.98(d). 
79.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.99(a). 
80.  Id. 
81.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.99(b). 
82.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.99(b)(1). The evidence sanction would prohibit the drafting 
party from conducting in the civil action. 
83.  CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.99(b)(2) (the terminating sanction would result in an order 
striking the pleadings, rendering judgment by default, or a contempt sanction). 
84.  ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 707, at 11 (Jun. 18 2019). 
85.  ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 707, at 11 (Jun. 18 2019). 
